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Getting relief to marginalised minorities:




Little academic research has examined the challenges humanitarian actors face or the strategies they develop in
the increasingly numerous authoritarian and low-intensity conflict settings. Based on 4 months of qualitative
fieldwork in Myanmar in 2017–2018, this article explores how civil society organisations, international non-
governmental organisations, international organisations, and donor agencies tried to provide relief to marginalised
minorities in the ethnic States of Chin and Rakhine following Cyclone Komen in 2015. The study findings detail
how civil society actors mobilised parallel minority and Christian networks and lobbied international actors to
support disaster victims of Chin ethnicity. In Rakhine State, it was overwhelmingly international humanitarians who
were able and willing to support Muslims, including the Rohingya. This increased tensions among community
groups and between Myanmar and the international community. Particularly in the context of rising identity
politics, humanitarian governance encompasses the governance of perceptions. Trade-offs between long-term
acceptance and following humanitarian principles in aid allocation are largely unavoidable and must be carefully
considered.
Keywords: Humanitarian aid, Disaster response, Flood, Conflict, Identity politics, Minority groups, Civil society,
Myanmar, Case study
Introduction
When massive floods hit Myanmar’s1 Rakhine State in
summer 2015, members of the Muslim Rohingya minor-
ity fled their homes to seek refuge in government shel-
ters. However, unlike their Buddhist neighbours, the
Rohingya were turned away. They could have stayed at
the shelters if they had signed documents identifying
themselves as Bengalis, but they were very unlikely to do
this. For decades, the Rohingya have battled to gain the
official recognition as an ethnic group necessary to ob-
tain Myanmar citizenship, which the Myanmar constitu-
tion ties to belonging to a recognised ‘national race’
(Cheesman 2017; Parnini 2013).
The above events were reported by The Burma Times
(2015), an exile diaspora newspaper. They may have ac-
tually occurred, but the story may also simply be one
bullet in the discursive battle surrounding the treatment
of Myanmar’s multiple ethnic and religious minorities.2
In Myanmar, nationalist discourses ‘othering’ those who
are not Buddhist or ethnically Bamar have permeated
the societal, political and law-making spheres (Farzana
2015, pp. 297–298; Lee 2016; Renshaw 2013; Wade
2017). Regardless of its veracity, the story calls for a
closer look at the marginalisation minority groups faced
in the 2015 disaster response after flooding and land-
slides were triggered by a heavy monsoon season and
compounded by the cyclone Komen throughout
Myanmar. Most importantly, the story raises questions
regarding how members of Myanmar’s vibrant civil society
and international humanitarians navigated a context where
conflict and identity politics played out during the re-
sponse. Although challenges confronting civil society and
humanitarian actors in authoritarian and conflict-affected
contexts have been explored (e.g., Harvey 2013; Kahn and
Cunningham 2013; del Valle and Healy 2013; Desportes et
al. 2019), very little academic research has investigated the
practices developed to overcome them.
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Based on 4 months of qualitative fieldwork, this article
aims to describe the challenges and navigation strategies
associated with supporting minority groups, as perceived
and recounted by representatives of civil society organi-
sations (CSOs), international non-governmental organi-
sations (INGOs) and international organisations (IOs)
that were part of the 2015 disaster response in Chin and
Rakhine States. These states were chosen as the two eth-
nic regional states most impacted by the disasters, pre-
senting different minority tension dynamics, and
fieldwork possibilities.
The case studies on minority support following the
2015 disasters inform two broader debates. The first con-
cerns the understudied disaster–conflict nexus (King and
Mutter 2014). How conflict and disaster dynamics interact
is particularly poorly understood in settings of
low-intensity conflict (LIC), which are predominantly
caused by intra-state political and social tensions (Heidel-
berg Institute for International Conflict Research [HIIK]
2016). Worldwide, most current conflicts are LICs (HIIK
2016; Human Security Report Project 2013). Focusing on
how disaster response is shaped towards minorities—
groups collectively identifying around characteristics such
as ethnic origin, religion, culture, or language (Azar
1990)—places a magnifying glass on core LIC–disaster dy-
namics. This is especially true in a context of rising iden-
tity politics, where certain groups are marginalised in the
politicised response, creating difficulties for humanitarian
actors who remain political players despite their actions
being driven by moral rather than political norms (Kahn
and Cunningham 2013; del Valle and Healy 2013).
The second debate involves minorities as a core fric-
tion point in discussions on humanitarians’ interference
in national state affairs (humanitarianism–sovereignty
tensions). Kahn and Cunningham (2013, p. 39) note that,
in recent decades, a ‘fundamental gap has developed be-
tween states and international humanitarian actors in
terms of describing what sovereignty entails and how it
is expressed’ and that how these tensions can be man-
aged, especially by humanitarian actors, needs to be bet-
ter understood. The well-being of people caught up in
crises constitutes ‘the contested ground on which states
and humanitarian actors clash’ (Kahn and Cunningham
2013, p. 139). Often, especially in authoritarian states,
and certainly in Myanmar (Décobert 2016; Matelski
2016b; Smith 2010), contestation over minorities’ welfare
and rights is particularly intense.
Challenges and social navigation practices to
support minorities in authoritarian low-intensity
conflict settings
As politically and socially shaped events, disaster re-
sponse processes reveal the dynamics criss-crossing soci-
ety, state and aid relations (Pelling and Dill 2010;
Hutchison 2014). This is particularly true in countries
fraught by conflict, although it is important to differenti-
ate among conflict types (van Voorst and Hilhorst 2017).
LICs are marked by fewer violent events and deaths
compared with high-intensity conflicts (HIIK 2016), but
LICs show high levels of volatility and structural vio-
lence, such as the marginalisation of minority groups by
the state (Azar 1990). Disaster response can then be the
very conduit through which the LIC is played out, fur-
ther side-lining minorities, harming political opponents
or increasing political support (cf. Jacoby and Özerdem
2008 [Turkey]; Flanigan 2008 [Lebanon and Sri Lanka];
Desportes et al. 2019 [Ethiopia]). When a disaster strikes
a LIC setting, state and societal actors are likely to con-
test each other’s legitimacy, capacity and will to protect
disaster victims—for instance, by accusing government
authorities of not letting members of ethnic or religious
minorities into flood shelters.
Authoritarian LIC settings present specific challenges
for civil society and international disaster responders.
Authoritarian practices, defined as ‘patterns of action
that sabotage accountability to people over whom a pol-
itical actor exerts control, or their representatives, by
means of secrecy, disinformation and disabling voice’
(Glasius 2018, p. 517), translate into restrictions on in-
formation, right to expression and to assembly. Méde-
cins Sans Frontières (MSF), an INGO, have reported
state restrictions on ‘geographic access, programmatic
options, and modalities of work’ in the authoritarian
contexts of Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and
Myanmar (del Valle and Healy 2013, p. 198). In Ethiopia,
civil society and international actors have described their
inability to freely shape aid provision because of the gov-
ernmental ‘iron cage of bureaucracy’ and restricted civil
society space (Desportes et al. 2019, p. 19). Humanitar-
ian independence is put to the test when LIC dynamics
enter into the disaster response process and question
the impartiality of aid delivery, but this cannot be openly
discussed under strict state control (Desportes et al.
2019). For instance in Myanmar, for decades following
the 1960s, and also more recently during the Rohingya
crisis, organisations, journalists, researchers and activists
who wrote critically about the regime were blacklisted,
banned or denied entry to the country (Selth 2018, p. 6).
Glasius et al. (2018) highlight the sense of uncertainty
prevalent under authoritarian regimes, stressing the arbi-
trariness of state decisions and the context-specific ‘fluid
lines’ that make what is permissible ambiguous. In
addition to the ‘big politics’ that may clearly restrict ac-
cess or operations, seemingly softer ‘everyday politics’
unfold (Hilhorst 2013, p. 232), and the quiet, mundane
practices of state bureaucracy can restrict aid permis-
sions in more duplicitous ways. A travel authorisation
being held up by ‘bureaucratic delays’ would be more
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difficult to contest on humanitarian grounds than would
a clear refusal to grant access to an area. The function-
ing of mostly opaque state institutions (Kahn and Cun-
ningham 2013) adds uncertainty, as do LIC dynamics.
High tensions between ethnic, religious and/or societal
groups and the state increase the risk of arbitrary ‘snap
decisions’ and unpredictable eruptions of violence (Azar
1990; Galtung 1996; Kalyvas 2003). This results not only
in state-imposed limitations on non-governmental ac-
tors; the same actors also internalise self-censorship
practices because of fear of over-stepping the fluid lines
or escalating tensions (Desportes et al. 2019).
Whether actors choose to self-censor or to act and
speak out depends partially on their ‘actor pedigree’
(Douma and Hilhorst 2006; Schennink et al. 2006). For
example, denouncing a breach of humanitarian princi-
ples better fits the institutional model, mandate and hab-
itus of the privately funded and testimony-oriented
INGO MSF3 than that of the domestic National Red
Cross Red Crescent Society, which is legally auxiliary to
the state. Which risks can be taken also depends on ac-
tors’ capacity to ‘disentangle themselves from confining
structures, plot their escape and move towards better
positions’ (Vigh 2009, p. 419). Detailing what he refers
to as social navigation processes, Vigh (2009) draws a
parallel with Jackson’s (1998) concept of ‘manoeuvring’,
the striving for balance and control. Social navigation di-
rects the analytical gaze not towards structures and
boundaries actors face or how they act in their social en-
vironment, but rather towards how actors ‘interact with
their social environment and adjust their lives to the
constant influence […] of social forces and change’
(Vigh 2009, p. 433). As such, social navigation is a
good fit for understanding the daily practices of ac-
tors seeking to reach a specific goal (here, minority
support), in a context of restrictive and uncertain
space to manoeuvre.
Civil society actors
Previous research shows civil society actors to be par-
ticularly skilled social navigators. In Myanmar, the
phrase ‘civil society’ is generally used to denote ‘any
group or initiative that is not directly piloted by the gov-
ernment’ aiming to advance common interests (Desaine
2011, pp. 12–13; Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies
2009, p. 6). CSOs can be divided into community-based
organisations (CBOs), primarily linked to a specific eth-
nic or religious group, and the more Western-oriented,
officially registered local non-governmental organisa-
tions (LNGOs). Civil society actors are deeply embedded
in and knowledgeable about the dynamics of the area
where they operate. CSOs in Myanmar have accumu-
lated decades of experience responding to ‘conflict, op-
pressive structures, and natural disaster through
self-organisation, self-protection, and covert resistance’
(Matelski 2016b, p. 24).
In Myanmar, ‘ethnic identity […] is complex, politically
charged and highly determinant of people’s personal and
political identities and associations/affiliations’ (Drew
2016, p. 8), and ethnicity and religion constitute prime
fault lines of civil society (Matelski 2016b). In situations
of conflict and repression, minority group boundaries
generally become more salient, reinforcing within-group
loyalty and altruism (Flanigan et al. 2015, p. 1793). This
can affect the impartial delivery of aid, as CSOs are
caught in their own web of ‘ethnic proximity,
socio-political affiliation or local pressure’ (Zyck and
Krebs 2015, p. 3). However, local embeddedness also
generates the ties of trust with communities necessary
for aid operations’ ‘access, cover and legitimacy’ (Wallis
and Jacquet 2011).
Desaine (2011, p. 8) explains the prevalence of CSOs
in ethnic States and among minority religions, noting
that they are ‘most likely to find operational space in
marginal areas, where the Bamar prevailing state and its
symbols have less presence’. Myanmar CSOs rely upon
three major social navigation strategies. The first is the
long-term decision making that shapes an organisation’s
pedigree: operating from outside or inside the country,
and more or less formally (Desaine 2011). Some organi-
sations balance formalisation’s advantages (e.g. ability to
receive international funding as a registered LNGO) and
disadvantages (e.g. obligation to submit programmes and
budgets to the government) by engaging in partnerships.
For example, CSOs not registered as LNGOs can retain
independence and flexibility while also accessing (West-
ern) funds and a legal framework via participation in lar-
ger national or international umbrella organisations
(Wallis and Jacquet 2011). Second, on a case-by-case
basis, civil society actors adapt ‘their terminology, their
visibility, and sometimes their actual activities to the
limitations posed by central and local authorities’
(Matelski 2016b, p. 178–179). How this is done depends
on the ‘the context of the moment, connections with/
protection from the government, location and degree of
sensitivity of the work’ (Desaine 2011, p. 19). Third, at a
broader all-compassing level, civil society actors are well
versed in the ‘politics of silence’, influencing decisions
not through direct confrontation, but by ‘remaining low
profile’ (Desaine 2011, p. 7).
International humanitarian actors
International humanitarian actors add to the complexity
of governance (Hilhorst 2016). In Myanmar, the ‘de-
cade-long conflict over the legitimacy of competing
socio-political and armed actors’ intermingles with ‘the
evolving agendas and priorities of international players’
through ‘politics, money, and power’ (Décobert 2016, p.
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6). These factors play out, for instance, when authoritar-
ian states refuse international assistance, as initially oc-
curred when Cyclone Nargis devastated Myanmar in
2008 (Alles 2012; Selth 2008). Paik (2011) details how
authoritarian regimes balance political need and risk re-
garding accepting foreign aid and, if accepted, the degree
of government control exerted over the movement of
foreign aid workers and resources. In the Nargis re-
sponse, foreign aid was eventually allowed ‘selectively
and reluctantly’ and was mostly distributed via govern-
ment channels; Western rescue and medical staff and
many vessels carrying relief goods were turned away at
Myanmar’s border (Paik 2011, pp. 450, 455).
International actors ranging from the United Nations
(UN) to INGOs have long been reticent to take a stand
on governments’ treatment of minorities (Fortman 2006,
p. 35). Taking such a stand in regimes that perceive cul-
tural heterogeneity as a threat to political unity and sta-
bility would be especially likely to raise tensions (Koenig
and de Guchteneire 2007). The move towards a multi-
cultural understanding of the nation-state and the emer-
gence of an international human rights regime led to
new repertoires of contention and claim making, enab-
ling humanitarian actors and other governments to legit-
imately challenge national governments (Koenig and
Guchteneire 2007). Still, engaging on minority issues can
be a double-edged sword. Referring to Myanmar, Taylor
(1982, p. 7) argues that ‘ethnic politics is the obverse of
the politics of national unity’ when conflicts around so-
cioeconomic issues are increasingly framed as ethnic.
The new repertoires of contention and claim making
regarding minorities have hardly permeated
disaster-related policy and practice. Disaster practi-
tioners still portray themselves as apolitical and tech-
nical—partly to facilitate access and operations (Peters
2017). Harvey (2013) asserts that, although humanitar-
ians often take cover behind humanitarian principles to
avoid engaging with states in conflict settings, an in-
creasing number of frameworks and guidelines codify
humanitarian–state engagement following disasters. Dis-
aster policy mentions a need to focus on the most vul-
nerable or marginalised and indigenous populations.4
However, demands such as the inclusion of indigenous
knowledge in disaster risk reduction and response pro-
grammes are mostly apolitical, based on a romanticised
depiction of indigenous peoples as interwoven with na-
ture (Hilhorst et al. 2015). Issues such as exploitation or
rights violations, which can contribute to disaster vul-
nerability and marginalisation during the response, are
largely neglected.
It is uncertain how similar social navigation options
are for international humanitarians and civil society ac-
tors. In the authoritarian contexts of Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan, del Valle and Healy (2013, p. 189)
concluded that, for MSF, ‘successful access negotiations
hinged heavily on demonstrating added value (medical
relevance) while simultaneously building relationships
with authorities […] and hoping that such measures
could promote a level of acceptance or trust needed to
operate’. One would expect international humanitarians’
navigation routes to be more limited, given the ability of
authorities to control ‘external agents’ through visas,
travel authorisations and other procedures. The steady
trend towards the rationalisation and coordination of
humanitarian action since the 1990s can also limit op-
tions (Duffield 1997). Today, standards and blueprint in-
stitutional structures are largely applied across countries.
Aiming to increase transparency and accountability, the
standardisation ‘largely reflect[s] the concerns, priorities
and values of technical professionals in Northern agen-
cies’; this leaves little room for co-shaping programmes
with in-country humanitarian partners or adapting to
complex humanitarian situations (Dufour et al. 2004, p.
124). Although INGOs often choose to fit into this ‘stan-
dardised’ humanitarian system, many remain more flex-
ible regarding funding and decision making (Davey et al.
2013; Lyons 2014).
In Myanmar, prior to the democratisation process
starting in 2011, international actors were known for a
fixed, polarised stance in an ‘internationalised battle of
legitimacies’, either judging it more effective to engage
constructively with the government or preferring to op-
erate cross-border, informally and/or via CSOs (Déco-
bert 2016, p. 8; Duffield 2008). Desaine (2011) argues
that international actors perceived LNGOs as systemat-
ically opposed to the (semi-)military regime and always
on the side of good. It remains to be seen how these dy-
namics had evolved by 2015.
Methods
The present article is based on primary data I collected
during a 4-month period (September 2017–February
2018) in Yangon and Chin State. During the fieldwork,
restrictions and intense violence described by the UN as
‘very likely’ ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya (Trihartono
2018, p. 7; UN 2018, p. 8) made access to Rakhine im-
possible and increased distrust towards outsiders inter-
ested in humanitarian issues. This also hampered access
to some Yangon-based organisations deeply involved in
the crisis, especially those I suspected of relying on more
‘informal’ methods. However, disaster response processes
could be reconstructed through conversations with ap-
proachable Yangon-based practitioners who had been
directly involved in the 2015 cyclone response in
Rakhine and/or Chin State as decision makers based in
offices or on the ground. A 10-day trip to Hakha, the
landslide-impacted capital of Chin State, allowed direct
observation and interaction with actors in a minority
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area. The trip was largely spent with Hakha community
members who had been displaced since 2015, CBO and
LNGO employees, and INGO staff members who were
involved in the 2015 response from their Asian regional
headquarters.
The data collection involved documented exchanges
with a total of 71 participants, 46 of whom participated
in in-depth semi-structured interviews or focus group
discussions. Interview participants were selected from
key organisations involved in the 2015 response, as de-
termined based on grey literature and referral sampling.
The data collection focused on perceived marginalisa-
tion, challenges and strategies developed during the
2015 Komen response in Chin and Rakhine States, spe-
cifically in the strongly disaster-impacted townships of
Hakha (the Chin State capital) and north of Sittwe (the
Rakhine State capital) (outlined in blue in Fig. 1). Al-
though some depth is lost by detailing processes in two
areas instead of one, the comparison highlights the di-
versity of LIC and minority dynamics within a
single-country context and enables a differentiated and
layered account of social navigation strategies.
As shown in Table 1, I aimed to engage with a large
variety of non-governmental actors. For instance, for
civil society actors, I approached members of more and
less formalised organisations (LNGOs vs. CBOs),
including those positioned closer to either international
or ethnic/religious networks and those claiming to have
a bridging role. During the Yangon-based interviews,
trust and deeper insight were attained as respondents
first discussed less sensitive Chin State dynamics and
then contrasted these with those in Rakhine. Additional
data were collected from secondary sources (press clip-
pings, humanitarian and CSO reports used for lobbying),
through everyday observation and from casual conversa-
tions (e.g. during formal CSO meetings in Hakha and in-
formal dinner discussions with humanitarian actors in
Yangon). All data were stored using NVivo and analysed
using both pre-determined codes and codes derived
through a thematic analytical process (Braun and Clarke
2006).
Several fieldwork limitations affected the conclusions
that could be drawn. The 2017 escalation of tensions
and violence among community groups and between hu-
manitarian actors and the government may have influ-
enced respondents’ recollection of 2015 dynamics. The
one interview with a government representative, who
mostly recited government policies and questioned the
rationale of my research and presence in Myanmar, indi-
cated that minorities and even humanitarian support
were topics too sensitive to discuss with such officials.
Furthermore, the data certainly reflect respondents’
Fig. 1 Case study areas and 2015 flood-affected townships. Case study areas (framed in blue) and flood-affected areas compiled based on
government and humanitarian sources on 3 August 2015 (in red). Source: modified based on UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs 2015b
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personal trajectories. For example, statements on mar-
ginalisation must be treated with caution in a context
where memories of human rights violations are still
fresh. Acknowledgement of relief coming from the gov-
ernment or military was rarely unprompted and often
given grudgingly, as is reflected in a statement made by
a Hakha resident during a focus group (#8, 22 November
2017)5: ‘Yes, the army provided tar for the road recon-
struction. But leave the military out of it. I don’t even
want their money’.
In line with the epistemological paradigm of critical
realism and the interpretive approach (Summer and
Tribe 2008, p. 58), the subjectivity of framings and diver-
gences among them are part of my findings and reflect-
ive of the broader LIC dynamics at play.
Context
In 2015, Myanmar experienced heavy monsoon rains,
and cyclone Komen triggered landslides and the most
widespread flooding in decades, leaving 125 dead and
1,676,086 temporarily displaced (UN Office for the Co-
ordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2015a, 2015b). Cyc-
lone Komen made landfall at a time of heightened
Myanmar identity politics—a few months after four dis-
criminatory ‘Race and Religion’ laws were passed and a
few months before the tense November 2015 elections.
In the broader context, a triple transition increased
volatility and uncertainty for minorities, CSOs and inter-
national humanitarian actors. First, anti-minority and es-
pecially anti-Muslim attitudes rose to a level of explosive
hatred and vengeance, not least on social media (Kipgen
2013; Wade 2017). Second, the partial democratic transi-
tion multiplied the institutional entry points among mili-
tary and civilian institutions, both of which are present
from the highest governance level, the Union govern-
ment, to the township level (Sifton 2014). Third, the
Myanmar aid system was overhauled. Myanmar jumped
from lowest international aid beneficiary per capita in
the region, with close to no aid going through the gov-
ernment (Kang 2012, p. 352), to 'donor' darling sta-
tus with the establishment of UN sectors, clusters, and
permanent donor and INGO headquarters (Décobert
2016, p. 63). For the first time, the Myanmar Union gov-
ernment officially appealed to international cyclone sup-
port on 4 August 2015. The government then worked
with staff dispatched from the United States’ Federal
Emergency Management Agency in the newly oper-
ational Crisis Management Unit in Myanmar’s capital of
Nay Pyi Daw.
Not all local structures benefitted from the exponential
increase in international donor interest following Nargis
and the 2011 political liberalisation process. Civil society
actors had gained legitimacy following their mobilisation
as sometimes sole responders to cyclone Nargis in 2008
(Desaine 2011; Selth 2008; South et al. 2011). Thousands
of informal CSOs emerged, some officially registering as
LNGOs when the process was facilitated in 2014
(LNGO#13, 22 January 2018). Matelski (2016a, p. 117)
highlights how Western funding has mostly reached
state actors and the limited LNGOs considered suffi-
ciently ‘professional’ and supportive of Western
interests.
Chin and Rakhine were the only two ethnic States de-
clared disaster-affected zones by the Myanmar Union
government because floods and landslides surpassed
local response capacities (Zaw and Lim 2017, p. 2). Dis-
aster impacts, LIC/minority tensions and humanitarian
dynamics varied greatly between the two states.
Chin State
Bordering Rakhine State to the east and India to the
north, Chin State was strongly hit by the 2015 floods but
especially the landslides, which swept away fields, roads
and bridges in mountainous areas. The Myanmar Na-
tional Natural Disaster Management Committee (2015a)
identified Hakha township as one of the five most
Table 1 Overview of interviewees and focus group participants
Actor type Number of participants*
Civil society disaster response actors Community-based organisations 4
Local non-governmental organisations 7
International humanitarian actors International non-governmental organisations 9
International organisations such as UN agencies 7
Humanitarian donors 4
Independent consultant 1
Other Chin State government official 1
Academics, local and foreign 4
Residents displaced by the 2015 Hakha landslide 10
Total 47
*Participant numbers refer to in-depth interviews, except for displaced residents, who participated in focus groups
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affected townships nationwide. In Hakha town, entire
neighbourhoods were wiped out, affecting 6535 and dis-
placing more than 4254, according to a CBO assessment
(Chin Committee for Emergency Response and Rehabili-
tation [CCERR] 2015, p. 11).
The Chin are a predominantly Christian religious
group and have faced persecution in Myanmar. In Chin
State, ‘the military has been accused of the destruction of
churches and Christian symbols, of forced conversion to
Buddhism, and of killing several Christian leaders’
(Sakhong 2007, cited in Matelski 2016b, p. 65). Today,
Chin State is considered the poorest and most remote
State in Myanmar6 (UN Development Programme
2011). The ‘state–subject relationship between the Chins
and the Bamar state’ has historically been distant (Mark
2016, p. 142). At the 2013 Chin National Conference,
Chin political and civil society actors called for a stron-
ger role for state government, involvement and consent
of indigenous/ethnic minority groups, transparency and
accountability, and more Chin political representation at
Union level (Mark 2016, p. 153).
There is division among more than 50 different Chin
ethnic sub-groups belonging to different Christian church
denominations and in rarer cases also Animist faith
(Desaine 2011, p. 36). Little presence of IOs and INGOs
in this remote area is partly offset by extensive, mostly
Christian, diaspora networks spanning the globe. Linkages
among Chin communities and international Christian
churches, Western advocacy groups and INGOs are
strong, building on a tradition of British missionary and
educational work and the colonial British preference to
work with Christian organisations (Desaine 2011; Matelski
2016a, p. 95). In Myanmar, Christian organisations appear
more visible compared with Buddhist organisations
(Desaine 2011, p. 13), and Christians are generally
over-represented in CSOs (Heidel 2006).
Rakhine State
As the most western and coastal State of Myanmar,
Rakhine was hit first when cyclone Komen made landfall
on 31 July 2015. Strong winds and rains caused land-
slides and extensive flooding in eight townships, with
125,151 houses damaged and 217,246 acres of arable
land destroyed. As of 4 September 2015, 96,165 inhabi-
tants of Rakhine State were still displaced (National Nat-
ural Disaster Management Committee 2015b).
The five townships situated north of the State capital
of Sittwe were also the theatre of the 2012 intercommu-
nal violence that killed hundreds and displaced 140,000.
Detailing the historical and politico-military context of
the Rakhine border with Bangladesh, Farzana (2015, p.
296) refers to the area as in ‘continual disorder’ since the
1784 local rebellion against Burmese invasion.7 In 2015,
tensions were high among diverse ethnic and religious
groups: Buddhists of sometimes Bamar but predomin-
antly Rakhine ethnicity; socioeconomically weaker Mus-
lims, historically deprived of economic opportunities
and of ‘political rights and opportunity of service in the
government, ministries, directorates, departments, cor-
porations, judiciary, education and local administrative
councils’ (Parnini 2013, p. 286); and other minorities
lacking political representation. The last group included
a few thousand Rakhine residents of Chin ethnicity
(CCERR 2015). The approximately one million
Rakhine-based Rohingya are among the most margina-
lised minorities in Southeast Asia. They have faced in-
tense human rights violations at the hands of the
population and the Myanmar military (Farzana 2015;
Kipgen 2013). When cyclone Komen struck, 140,000
Rohingya were still housed in camps for internally dis-
placed persons (IDPs) (European Civil Protection and
Humanitarian Aid Operations 2015).
Together with conflict-ridden Kachin, northern Rakhine
State has the highest presence of international humanitar-
ian actors outside of Yangon. A few international organisa-
tions have carried out cross-border operations since the
1980s, but not without challenges. MSF France decided to
withdraw from the region and country in 2004, as changing
regulations hampered organisations’ freedom of movement
and work. That same year, the International Committee of
the Red Cross was forced to suspend activities (Currie
2012, p. 26; International Crisis Group 2006, p. 8). An inter-
national Rakhine humanitarian cluster was established in
Sittwe after violence flared up in 2012, also impacting the
Western staff of international humanitarian organisations.
Many aid organisations chose to call their Western staff
back from Rakhine to minimise safety risks or were forced
to leave by the government, as was the case for MSF Hol-
land (Matelski 2016b, p. 243). The Organisation for Islamic
Cooperation was never authorised to provide post-2012
support in Myanmar—a decision backed by Buddhist dem-
onstrators (British Broadcasting Corporation 2012). Accu-
sations of bias from residents of Rakhine ethnicity towards
‘Western organisations’ were not unfounded. The CDA
Collaborative Learning Projects (2009, p. 10) highlight how
the Rohingya were ‘considerably more likely’ to re-
ceive support from INGOs and IOs, whereas Buddhist
ethnic Rakhines were more likely to receive support
from the government. This report thus concluded that
foreign aid played into the local conflict dynamics.
Concerning civil society actors, Desaine (2011, p. 38)
mentions a void of LNGOs in northern Rakhine and
an increasing presence of LNGOs ‘based on Buddhist
charitable pillars’ in southern Rakhine.
Findings
For both States, this section details (i) how respondents
perceived minorities to be marginalised in the
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government response and the disaster response of
(ii) civil society and (iii) international actors, including
the challenges they faced. Social navigation strategies are
also presented for the actor group most instrumental in
providing relief to minorities.
Chin state
A marginalising government response?
Community respondents and civil society actors
approached in Hakha and Yangon accused the Union
government of neglect, in both interviews and official
publications. One report issued by a CBO (CCERR
2015) argued that, although Chin State is the poorest in
Myanmar and among the hardest hit by the 2015 floods
and landslides, only 4% of Myanmar Union flood relief
funding went to the state. Additionally, the state govern-
ment’s coordination efforts, which were described as
corrupt, following the whims of the Union capital and
mostly employing non-Chins, were deemed late and dis-
appointing. In Hakha, government relief reportedly
reached only 2000–3000 people; there was a ‘difference
in thousands’ between the counts of people impacted
provided by the General Administration Department
and by CBOs and LNGOs (LNGO#2, 23 November
2017). One CBO respondent (#2, 17 January 2018)
stressed that government control is only problematic
when the response deviates from the ‘moral contract’ of
fair and transparent aid distribution. In Hakha, poorer
households, for instance, did not qualify for governmen-
tal disaster support because they did not live in formally
registered housing. Furthermore, Union government re-
lief shipped to government warehouses was not distrib-
uted to victims (LNGO#2, 23 November 2017; CBO#3,
23 November 2017). In September 2018, a CBO state-
ment publically denounced the wasting of aid and the
General Administration Department keeping the
remaining disaster relief funds (CCERR 2018).
Respondents debated whether the discrepancy between
actual needs and what the government provided was
caused only by logistical difficulties of getting aid to the
remote Chin mountains, where there was no airport and
roads had been destroyed by the storm—as advanced by
several humanitarians and the government official (#1,
23 November 2017)—or whether this discrepancy was
also a manifestation of the ‘double C curse’, reflecting
marginalisation for being Chin and Christian. The latter
explanation was supported by all Chin respondents and
by Burmese non-Chin INGO representatives. According
to a Chin-based LNGO representative (#14, 19 January
2018), ‘some say there was discrimination [and] that gov-
ernment response was limited because we are Christians.
The government said in the news [that] they were giving
out bags of rice, but that was only in the news’.
A thin international response
The above accusations of marginalisation were dismissed
by a few foreign respondents, including one who had
worked for a Chin LNGO (#2, 25 October 2017).
Yangon-based humanitarians operating country-wide
emphasised that responding in Chin State was not the
highest priority and was very difficult logistically (IO#3,
7 November 2017). Only actors with a permanent pres-
ence in Hakha (a few larger IOs and one INGO) pro-
vided direct support, mainly in government-regulated
IDP camps. Their support through hygiene, education
and non-food items was welcomed by Chin-based
LNGOs, CBOs and residents. A representative of a
Christian INGO that channelled funds through
like-minded faith-based LNGOs recounted difficulties in
obtaining travel authorisations from the Union govern-
ment for monitoring visits (INGO#2, 20 November
2017).
An overwhelmingly civil society response for minorities
Internationally funded Christian LNGOs, and especially
CBOs, were the primary responders. One LNGO dir-
ector (#2, 23 November 2017) reported channelling
some of their funding to a CBO because they had ‘lots
of connections and cooperate with civil society’. There
were rumours that funds sourced through the Chin dias-
pora and Christian networks surpassed the government’s
relief budget, but it proved difficult to obtain the exact
numbers.
However substantial, the civil society response should
not be romanticised. Several CSO respondents accused
major Hakha-based CBO networks of lacking account-
ability and channelling resources to their own ethnic
sub-groups, churches or geographical areas. This was
stated in two independent focus group discussions with
displaced Hakha residents. Among many examples, resi-
dents recounted how a Hakha-based Christian associ-
ation used donations to buy buses for their own use
(resident#6, 22 November 2017). They were particularly
disappointed with a locally established committee
founded to coordinate the civil society response in
Hakha, which had, they felt, mismanaged the process:
They only gave materials later, when they were rotten.
Decaying. We only got one-third of the donated mate-
rials. […] They only recently publicised how much
money they collected, but it was not clear where that
went, and we could not ask any questions. (resident#3,
22 November 2017)
Few strict governmental restrictions seemed to apply
to CBOs: many had not registered as organisations until
months after the initial relief phase. Still, CSOs faced
three main challenges: everyday delays and blockages
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caused by government authorities, difficulties in mobilis-
ing international aid funds and the risk of increasing
tensions over aid distribution decisions.
Concerning the first challenge, civil society actors ac-
cused the government of hampering their initiatives.
CBOs not fulfilling specific criteria were initially ex-
cluded from emergency meetings coordinated by the
state government, until it became clear how much fund-
ing civil society could contribute (LNGO#2, 23 Novem-
ber 2017). Additional examples illustrate authorities’
power to block, delay or raise the costs of relief activities
for Chin State. Aid supplies from the Royal Thai Air
Force were diverted to a Bamar-dominated area outside
of Chin State by the Union government (CBO#2, 17
January 2018). Additionally, as relief goods collected by
the Chin diaspora transited through Yangon airport, the
Union government levied high taxes, searched the goods
and kept them in customs for 2 weeks (LNGO#14, 19
January 2018).
Second, CBOs and LNGOs without ties to Christian
INGOs reported difficulty mobilising funding through
the newly ‘rationalised’ humanitarian system. CSOs pre-
viously had privileged relations with their ‘own trad-
itional donors, INGOs which [they] worked closely with’,
but they now had to ‘rely more and more on institu-
tional donors’ with intensive procedures and require-
ments. This was described by all LNGOs and even
international aid actors with longer experience in the
country as hampering responses that were, in the words
of one LNGO representative, ‘quick, flexible’ and some-
times also ‘conflict-sensitive’ (#6, 10 January 2018). Ac-
cording to a CBO representative (#2, 21 November
2017), the UN agencies they hoped to engage with
judged them as too blunt on the topic of minority mar-
ginalisation: ‘The [IO] once told us […], do not talk so
critical [or else] people will hate you and you will not
succeed. Try to be positive. But a CSO’s role is to make
noise’. The CBO wished to advocate for more minority
support, but that was perceived as biased by the
humanitarians.
Third, distributing relief without raising tensions
among the more than 50 different sub-ethnic and reli-
gious groups was considered challenging. An LNGO dir-
ector (#14, 19 January 2018) often had to counter
accusations of ethnic bias because her organisation was
named after her area of origin. A CBO representative
(#2, 17 January 2018) accused faith-based groups of
using the distribution of Chin diaspora funds for evan-
gelisation, especially in southern Chin, where Christian,
Buddhist and Animist groups coexist.
Civil society actors’ navigation strategies Civil society
actors chose from or combined two main routes to navi-
gate the above challenges: activating minority networks
and trying to play the government and the internation-
ally led relief system.
Civil society strategy 1: Activating minority networks
Large amounts of funding and supplies came from
neighbouring areas with similar minority backgrounds,
far from Nay Pyi Daw and Yangon, the power centres of
the Union government and the international humanitar-
ian system. Cars transporting relief goods donated by
the predominantly Christian Indian state of Mizoram
and the Kachin ‘brothers and sisters’ which share a simi-
lar ethnic background are not ‘illegal’ per se, but lie
within a ‘grey zone’ of informal practice. As put by a
Hakha resident, they ‘tasted Indian rice first’, before sup-
plies from Nay Pyi Daw reached them, if they ever did
(#4, 22 November 2017). To minimise tensions among
the different Chin ethnic sub-groups, the Kachin group
channelling resources asked for those resources to be di-
vided equally among all Chin townships. A CBO actor
(#2, 23 November 2017) criticised this practice, claiming
it was unfair to the most affected townships.
Charismatic individuals and their personal networks
were instrumental in mobilising funds outside the formal
humanitarian system. For instance, one donor (#4, 1
February 2018) reported how a CBO bypassed his organ-
isation to receive funding directly from his governments’
national treasury, using existing ties between a respected
Chin individual and a parliamentarian in that foreign
country. Less attached to regulations and conditions, this
funding could quickly reach Chin communities. Another
case involved a Chin LNGO leader (#14, 19 January
2018) who used a trip to attend a wedding in the United
States for fundraising in churches and Chin diaspora
communities, raising thousands of United States dollars.
Civil society actors also lobbied via the diaspora press,
deemed more independent than the in-country press
(LNGO#2, 23 November 2017). Chin actors generated
their own evidence to question the validity of the gov-
ernment and humanitarian disaster response. A
Chin-based CBO (#2, 17 January 2018) collected data on
disaster impacts and response, co-forming an extensive
network of data collection partners across communities.
Civil society strategy 2: Playing the humanitarian
system The results of the community impact assessment
introduced at the end of the previous paragraph were
presented at Yangon press conferences and a Nay Pyi
Daw Humanitarian Country Team meeting. This dem-
onstrates the extent of time and energy devoted to
lobbying humanitarian decision makers, who control
growing amounts of aid funding. These decision makers
can also ‘validate’ and ‘legitimate’ minorities’ plight by
directing funds to them. International actors seemed to
notice these efforts; several humanitarians referred to
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Chin CSOs as ‘vocal’ and ‘mobilised in complaining’ (e.g.
IO#3, 7 November 2017).
Whom to approach with what information and how to
do this were carefully considered. Sometimes,
approached actors’ follow-up moves were predicted in a
chess-like manner. The question of why the above
Chin-based CBO did not directly lobby Nay Pyi Daw au-
thorities with their report yielded an intricate answer:
The government makes the decision but especially the
UN provides them with information and support
[through] resources. We cannot approach the
government so much, so we go via the UN. In the
end, the government decides. So we constantly
observe the government – what they do, what
happens. The UN can influence the government […]
They took our data. We showed them our community
data and the government data, and the difference
between both. (CBO#2, 17 January 2018)
The abovementioned report included detailed com-
parative tables, graphs and ‘lots of footnotes for the do-
nors’ (academic#1, who edited the report, 6 November
2017). Speaking the language of the humanitarian system
was a strategy for playing this system. CSOs strategically
self-branded and adapted their discourse to suit their
targets. For example, one CBO (#2, 17 January 2018)
spelled out the ‘C’ in their organisational acronym as
‘Chin’ or ‘Community’, depending on whether they were
engaging with the Chin diaspora or the UN. Taking
self-framing to the individual level, an INGO official (#9,
5 January 2018) of Chin ethnicity but with a
Bamar-sounding name reported disclosing her ethnic
origin only when it was advantageous.
CBOs strategically appealed to allies who could help
them reach international audiences, such as the United
States academic who helped compile the Chin com-
munity data report or the ‘good influential UN guy’
who could be ‘grab[bed]’ to lobby in high-level hu-
manitarian meetings (CBO#2, 17 January 2018). I met
several ‘free-floating’ foreigners who brokered linkages
between civil society and international actors.
Rakhine State
A marginalising government response
Similar to the situation in Chin State, the 14.7% of
Union relief funds allocated to Rakhine State was
deemed insufficient given the large-scale coastal devasta-
tion (CBO#2, 17 January 2018). Statements made in in-
terviews and in print (e.g. CCERR 2015; ECHO 2015)
identified additional intra-state marginalisation in the
government response. First, locally powerful people such
as township administrators channelled aid towards their
own non-minority community groups (CBO#2, 17
January 2018; donor#3, 29 January 2018). Second, relief
modalities that might have been unproblematic in
less-divided settings further marginalised minorities. For
instance, relief cash grants ended up in the hands of the
local market owners, government regulations forbade
Muslim contractors from participating in public infra-
structure reconstruction, and government and some-
times IO relief was distributed from monasteries,
limiting non-Buddhists’ access (donor#4, 1 February
2018; CBO#2, 17 February 2018). Third, isolated cases of
severe minority marginalisation were reported. For ex-
ample, an IO official (#5, 11 January 2018) mentioned
that the relocation of Muslim flood victims in ‘military
vehicles’ was ‘not always done voluntarily’.
A thin civil society response for the most marginalised
minorities
Another layer of marginalisation was obstruction of self--
help and local relief initiatives’ for minorities. Margina-
lised and vulnerable minorities had less capacity to cope
and self-organise because of their lower economic and
social position and limited rights. Rohingya disaster vic-
tims in government IDP camps denied freedom of
movement are an extreme example (ECHO 2015).
Concerning CBO and LNGO support to Muslim
groups, and especially to the Rohingya, organisations
with Muslim ties were not allowed to operate. I could
find only one Muslim faith-based organisation, operating
in an IDP camp without a formal memorandum of un-
derstanding (MoU). The government would not provide
a MoU, but the group felt that operating under such
conditions yielded certain advantages: flexibility, reactiv-
ity, the ability to spend funds received from mostly
Muslim (sometimes diaspora) philanthropists worldwide
in a timely way, and less scrutiny—as long as their privi-
leged relationship with the local authorities continued
and the government saw benefit in having a ‘token
Muslim organisation’ operating (INGO#1, 10 October
2017).
CSOs without Muslim ties were largely unwilling to
assist Muslims. Several INGOs, IOs and donors who
would have liked to dispatch aid via local implementing
partners described Rakhine-based CBOs and LNGOs
as ‘not principled’. One INGO representative (#17, 23
January 2017) stated, ‘I prefer a localised response,
but this context really needs the international hand to
make sure the vulnerable people are targeted’. Indeed,
of all the CSOs I approached, only one staff member
of a Chin-based CBO primarily supporting Rakhine
residents of Chin ethnicity said that she personally
would have liked to also support Muslims including
the Rohingya, but that it was too risky for her
organisation:
Desportes Journal of International Humanitarian Action             (2019) 4:7 Page 10 of 16
We speak on behalf of other minority groups. But
with Muslims it is tricky on the ground […] Even if I
personally also feel for the Rohingya. But if you are in
a dangerous situation […] Between the tiger and the
snake, you have to be careful. Limits exist even for
[our organisation]. (CBO#2, 17 November 2017)
An overwhelmingly international response for the most
marginalised minorities
Assistance for Muslim groups, the most marginalised
minorities in Rakhine, was generally international. Inter-
national humanitarian actors faced four broad chal-
lenges: stigmatisation and security risks, government
control, uncertainty, and manipulation.
At organisational and individual staff levels, disaster
responders feared stigmatisation and security repercus-
sions of supporting Rakhine Muslims after the 2015 di-
sasters, as an IO representative mentioned: ‘In Rakhine,
everyone is poor. It is true the Muslims are often worse
off, but working only for them is a suicide mission’
(IO#10, 30 January 2018). One INGO representative
(#17, 23 January 2018) described how the movement of
every aid convoy passing through host communities and
any effort to resettle Rohingya groups somewhere with
better facilities were scrutinised, including by
non-Rohingya Muslim communities. Agencies providing
relief to Muslims were criticised in public demonstra-
tions and on social media, sometimes including the
names and photos of staff members, who were labelled
‘terrorists’ for helping ‘Muslim terrorists’. In this context,
the figure of the ‘inpat’ emerged: Burmese INGO or IO
staff members who had outsider status and faced stigma-
tisation from their own community for supporting an
ethnic or religious group other than their own in a
LIC-divided society.
Concerning engagement with government structures,
several respondents mentioned government restrictions
or conditions they had to satisfy, such as the impossibil-
ity of working with ‘non-citizen’ Rohingya disaster vol-
unteers or staff (INGO#16, 21 January 2018) and limited
access to Rohingya IDP camps (INGO#1, 10 October
2017). International humanitarian actors depend on
various government authorities for permits, MoUs for
programme activities and travel authorisations. Hu-
manitarians deemed it dangerous to denounce their
lack of independence. An INGO official (#17, 22
January 2018) admitted that ‘our organisation is usu-
ally a loud organisation […] but here we never par-
ticipate in a shout’.
Uncertainty about navigating complex government
structures also emerged. Many foreign aid workers de-
scribed feeling ‘overwhelmed’ by everything being in
transition. Some regulations continued, such as getting
authorisation from the village tract authorities, which
are part of the military-led General Administration De-
partment. However, with the political transition, entry
points multiplied, calling for ‘lots of negotiations, all the
time, with a lot of different dynamics’ (IO#2, 10 October
2018). Authorities under central civilian and military
leadership and parallel ethnic State and Union structures
operate at different governance levels, often without
communicating with each other—for instance about
authorisations granted to humanitarian actors. Govern-
ment authorities operate informally and unpredictably,
failing to record agreements (donor#4, 1 February 2018)
and switching travel authorisations on and off, thus
hampering planning (INGO#4, 18 October 2017). Orga-
nisations’ assessments of how the political transition im-
pacted their room for manoeuvre differed, and, as is
shown in the following extract from a Burmese staff
member of an INGO with a broader mandate, they criti-
cised organisations with different approaches:
Some humanitarian actors here act as if nothing has
changed. They still think the military is in control.
They hide some of their activities. They lie. We are
honest. We have nothing to hide, and it works. (#11,
10 January 2018)
Finally, several respondents described the govern-
ment’s ‘double game’. Officially, the authorities were not
receptive to demands for more minority support. The
Rohingya’s very identity is negated in government dis-
course, where their name is never mentioned. However,
behind the scenes, authorities pushed IOs and INGOs to
cater to Muslims only. An IO official characterised this
as a political manipulation tactic:
So often the government says ‘No, no, we will be
giving to the Rakhine community. And you do it for
the Muslim community’. That was the big issue from
the beginning. We are then perceived as the bad […]
Nobody in this country is interested in [being well
perceived] by the Rohingya. They do not count. It
is not an audience [anyone is] interested in. They
are interested in communicating the message that
they take care of the Rakhine, and mostly the
Bamar […] So it is a political manipulation. (IO#3,
7 November 2017)
Manipulating international humanitarian actors to
help only Muslims dates back at least to the 2012 inter-
communal violence. After organisations asked to help
both Buddhist and Muslim victims, ‘the government said
ok to both, but granted authorisation for helping the
Muslims first, and the other [authorisation] never came’
(donor#4, 1 February 2018).
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International actors’ navigation strategies The strat-
egies of two outlier disaster responders active in Rakhine
(the CBO channelling relief mainly towards Chins
through ethnic and religious networks and the Muslim
INGO operating without a MoU) were detailed above.
Otherwise, international humanitarians described four
main strategies for navigating Rakhine-specific chal-
lenges: targeting choices, perception management, ap-
proaching and distancing themselves from other actors,
and financial incentives to involve CSOs.
International strategy 1: Setting a course via
targeting In the LIC setting of Rakhine, selecting disas-
ter victims to help (i.e. targeting) was presented as key
to humanitarians’ acceptance by host communities and
the wider public, although the choice is not the organi-
sation’s alone, as the above statements concerning gov-
ernment manipulation highlighted. Two opposing logics
stood out and are here referred to using the terminology
commonly used by the respondents: ‘50/50’ vs.
‘needs-based’.
Each respondent framed her/his organisation’s target-
ing strategy as the most conflict-sensitive. Often, the
strategy also fit the organisation’s pedigree. The ‘50/50’
strategy meant providing exactly the same amount of
the same goods to antagonistic community groups, re-
gardless of need. This was considered the only viable so-
lution by many respondents but was dismissed as ‘the
50/50 trap’ (e.g. IO#10, 30 January 2018) by others. Like-
wise, the ‘needs-based approach’, which refers to the hu-
manitarian principle of impartiality, was defended by
some respondents and discarded as ‘utterly naïve’ in the
tense context by others.
International strategy 2: Hoisting the right flags Not
only what an actor does (e.g. their targeting strategy),
but also how their actions are perceived by various an-
tagonistic audiences, is important: ‘It is about [percep-
tion] balances. Of course, at the next level, tensions are
also manipulated’ (INGO#17, 22 January 2018). A few
respondents criticised perception management some-
times taking precedence over intrinsic activity rationales:
‘Some do activities to gain acceptance. Ok, let’s get ac-
ceptance. What can we do?’ (IO#10, 30 January 2018).
All respondents closely monitored the views circulat-
ing about their organisation and relief activities. That
was especially the case on social media, where stories
can rapidly be distorted and go viral. One such story was
the ‘mosque story’: An IO (#10, 30 January 2018) discov-
ered that it was being harshly criticised online for ‘fund-
ing mosques’ in Rakhine as part of the response. The IO
immediately dispatched field staff, finding that ‘village el-
ders had asked each cash grant beneficiary to give 10%
[of their grant] for the mosque reconstruction. We went
back and explained to them that this is not [how the
funds should be used] […] [To prevent such situations],
you have to be proactive concerning rumours and allega-
tions […] It can quickly turn against you’.
In addition to close monitoring, actors dedicated sig-
nificant effort to self-framing and communicating about
their relief work in the field, in print and online. One
IO8 asked for its logo to be removed from the UN
multi-actor flood relief overview map, as it did not want
to be associated with the domestically unpopular UN. A
donor (#4, 1 February 2018), despite agreeing overall
that it was disadvantageous to be visible in northern
Rakhine, thought it would benefit his organisation to
foreground flood relief activities through a one-page re-
port, local media and a press release. Larger INGOs and
IOs all have visibility guidelines9, and two important do-
nors (#3, 24 January 2018; #4, 1 February 2018)
highlighted perception management as a core discussion
point with the agencies they funded.
Concerning the Rohingya, international organisations
learned to mirror the language of authorities, sometimes
compromising on their own principles:
In 2015, we did not use the term ‘Rohingya’ […] If you
want to have a conversation at all, you should use the
same terms as the government, [‘Muslims’ or
‘Bengalis’] […] We consistently support the right of
self-identification, but in terms of relationship[s] with
authorities […], if you actually want to achieve some-
thing, do not say ‘Rohingya’. (donor#4, 1 February
2018)
Myanmar staff members were considered better versed
at adapting their behaviour and discourse. An IO staff
member thus reported that, to negotiate with author-
ities, they ‘usually send the Myanmar staff; they know
how to deal with authorities, with the strong state’
(IO#10, 30 January 2018).
International strategy 3: Navigating the actor
constellation Organisations with broader mandates in-
cluding development or policy work presented their or-
ganisational pedigree as beneficial to relief operations.
Long-term engagement with members of parliament
(INGO#11, 10 November 2017) or with Rakhine fishers
(donor #4, 1 February 2018) resulted in networks and
knowledge that were valuable for crisis moments. Pure
humanitarian actors also strategically reached out to au-
thorities who were ‘not essential’ to their relief work,
such as monastery leaders, to increase their acceptance
(IO#10, 30 January 2018).
Closed gatherings of humanitarian actors, such as the
Rakhine cluster, where all operating INGOs and IOs met
weekly in Sittwe, and the country-wide Humanitarian
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Country Team and INGO forum in Yangon, were pre-
sented as important for exchanging information, lobby-
ing and advocating in a context where openly doing so
alone is ineffective and possibly dangerous. The INGO
representative (#5, 11 January 2018) who mentioned
cases of involuntary, military-assisted relocation of
disaster-impacted Muslims in Rakhine was asked
whether his organisation had spoken out on this issue;
he responded, ‘we deal with this with the Humanitarian
Country Team. We are not so stupid as to do it alone’.
However, group advocacy seemed to focus mostly on
technical issues, such as a disaster law or relaxing cus-
toms for imported relief goods.
International strategy 4: Fishing for civil society
actors with financial incentives As CSOs were reluc-
tant to assist Muslim groups in Rakhine, one large
INGO reported negotiating ‘overhead costs’ with
LNGOs. This approach tied funding to the condition of
providing help to the most marginalised groups, al-
though, it seems, never explicitly to minorities. An
INGO staff member (#11, 10 January 2018) referred to
extra ‘incentive’ payments for LNGOs that would other-
wise not have worked as their flood-response imple-
menting partners in sensitive areas such as northern
Rakhine. Later in the interview, however, this staff mem-
ber denied using that term.
These financial incentives did not always convince
LNGOs. The director of a larger LNGO unaffiliated with
any minority (#15, 24 January 2018) explained that his
organisation only applied for this conditional funding if
the amount was large. Otherwise, ‘there is a common
understanding of our focus: hardest hit, women, [the]
elderly [and] children. Marginalised and discriminated
groups [are] not a part of it. We do not even know who
that is’.
Conclusion
The findings for both States revealed minority marginal-
isation practices by the Myanmar Union government,
with especially severe cases in Rakhine State. To support
disaster victims of Chin ethnicity, parallel minority and
diaspora networks were mobilised. Relief, which was not
always distributed in a transparent or unbiased manner,
was channelled from ethnically and religiously affiliated
groups within and outside of Myanmar. Strong civil so-
ciety structures and ties between Christian LNGOs and
INGOs also increased support, or at least attention, from
the international humanitarian system. Navigating an aid
system that is itself adjusting to the recent political and
humanitarian developments in Myanmar, proactive Chin
individuals carefully selected their lobbying strategies,
targets and allies. Some selectively foregrounded or
backgrounded their ethnic identity depending on
whether their interlocutor would be receptive to a more
political minority discourse.
For the most marginalised disaster victims in Rakhine
State, however, the Muslim and especially the Rohingya
minority identity led to a dead end rather than to paral-
lel civil society support channels. Civil society and dias-
pora actors were unwilling or unable to support
Muslims, leaving the task to international humanitarians.
Deeming it too risky to advocate openly, international
humanitarian actors devoted significant effort to navigat-
ing the governmental barriers and the social and political
tensions inherent in supporting highly stigmatised mi-
norities. This included closely monitoring authorities’
and different societal groups’ perceptions of their organi-
sations and activities and reaching out to Buddhist com-
munities, religious institutions and governmental actors
to increase acceptance. For many, ‘50/50’ became the
new targeting standard, openly departing from the prin-
ciples of humanity and impartiality for the sake of mini-
mising tensions. Ultimately, in a context where
perceptions and even strategic decisions such as target-
ing are manipulated, the humanitarians largely ended up
being played by the government system, which wanted
humanitarians to be seen as targeting only Muslims.
This article has mostly examined the perceptions of
Chin civil society and international humanitarian actors.
It left out the private sector (which is increasingly in-
volved in providing and/or channelling resources follow-
ing disasters in Myanmar), insurgent militarised actors,
regional actors such as the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations, and policy makers at global humanitarian
headquarters. Additional research considering these ac-
tors’ realities would likely uncover a larger variety of
state interactions and navigation strategies, involving in-
formal aid delivery and hidden diplomacy practices.
Two major points can be drawn from the present find-
ings. First, it is striking that a parallel system set up spe-
cifically to support marginalised groups—whether led by
civil society, as was the case for the Chin, or by inter-
national actors, as was seen for Muslims in Rakhine—
can be considered the only viable short-term solution. In
the long-term, such parallel systems may increase feel-
ings of exclusion and deepen the divide between antag-
onistic societal groups and between the Myanmar
government and the international community.
Second, especially in the context of rising identity pol-
itics, humanitarian governance encompasses the govern-
ance of perceptions. Navigating the multiple and rapidly
evolving LIC realities is difficult even within a single
country, especially for aid organisations with
country-wide mandates. As seen in the 2015 Komen re-
sponse, satisfying the expectations of the multiple audi-
ences is nearly impossible: Should one risk
compromising government authorisations, community
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acceptance and associated security, or the principle of
impartiality and, possibly, international funding? Balan-
cing between governing various perceptions and allocat-
ing aid resources according to humanitarian principles
involves largely unavoidable trade-offs that must be care-
fully evaluated by practitioners and policy makers.
Harvey (2013) states that, even in conflict settings
where governments fail to fulfil their responsibilities, hu-
manitarians should engage governments at the policy,
technical and practical levels through the framework of
humanitarian principles, despite the dilemmas this in-
volves. Although I agree with this point, it is not only a
humanitarian agenda that ‘attempts to ring-fence an
ever-shrinking isolationist humanitarian space’ (Harvey
2013, p. 167) that can be problematic. Disaster re-
sponders choosing to ‘water down the humanitarian
space’ to safeguard good relations with the state or one
community group risk becoming trapped in an increas-
ingly restricted space, achieving little more than staying
afloat. This can set precedents for state–humanitarian
interaction and further tip the power balance in favour
of the state. One telling example is that, by the time of
the 2018 Rohingya crisis response in Myanmar, it had
reportedly become ‘standard’ for a key IO to dispatch
their relief ‘without expats’ and always accompanied by
government officials (IO#10, 30 January 2018). In au-
thoritarian LIC settings, assessing in which cases con-
frontation might be needed remains a major challenge.
Because high-level declarations are less adapted to these
settings, negotiations at the operational level are key.
Endnotes
1In this article, I use the term ‘Myanmar’, mirroring
the usage of most of the research participants. The use
of the term does not reflect partiality in a context where
the political opposition rejected the term ‘Myanmar’,
which was unilaterally imposed by military rulers in
1989.
2Roughly 70% of the Myanmar population are of
Bamar ethnicity (1983 Census, Desaine 2011, p. 28), and
78.9% are Buddhists (2014 Census, Myanmar Ministry of
Information 2014). For decades, the government has
aimed to ‘homogenise the multifaceted ethnic and cul-
tural mosaic [that is Myanmar] into a national, unified,
Bamar entity' (Desaine 2011, p. 12). The government
recognises 135 different ethnic groups, excluding the
Rohingya, as belonging to the nation (Myanmar Ministry
of Information 2018).
3MSF has come to be ‘associated with the figure of the
humanitarian as witness’ who denounces human suffer-
ing (Décobert 2016, p. 21; Fassin 2007).
4For example, in the Sendai UN Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion Framework for Action (UN International Strategy
for Disaster Reduction 2015) and the UN agenda on
indigenous peoples and disasters (UN International
Strategy for Disaster Reduction 2008).
5Statements drawn from interviews or focus group dis-
cussions are presented with information on the type of
actor and date. Here, a statement is extracted from com-
munity member #8 during a focus group discussion held
on 22 November 2017.
6According to the Household Living Conditions As-
sessment survey conducted by the UN Development
Programme (2011), approximately 73% of the Chin State
population lives below the poverty line. Rakhine State
has the second highest poverty rate in Myanmar, at 44%.
7The policies enforced by subsequent regimes, from
the British colonial ‘divide-and-rule’ to Myanmar gov-
ernment policies of exclusion and ethnicisation, have re-
inforced ethnic boundaries around the numerous and
diverse population groups (Farzana 2010).
8To maintain confidentiality, the respondent identifica-
tion number is not disclosed here.
9For example, no photos where aid workers’ faces are
recognisable and no pre-election expressions of political
affiliations are allowed.
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